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I. INTRODUCTION
"[C]onstitutional law, now and always, is about values." 1
Traditional evaluations of the Supreme Court's constitutional opinions
focus on whether it has satisfied norms of legal craftsmanship and observed its
properly limited role as dictated by the precarious legitimacy of judicial review
in our democracy. An important criterion too often overlooked or
underemphasized is the clarity with which the Court expresses and justifies its
preference for one value over another. By clearly articulating the value
preference inherent in its decisions, the Court can perform an important
democratic function: enhancing the ability of a focused electorate to
understand, debate, and resolve the important issues of the day. Value clarity
thus may help to reconcile the practice of judicial review with democratic
values.
The first portion of this paper will review the various approaches which
currently dominate the debate over the proper purpose and scope of judicial
review, thereby providing context and contrast to the alternative advanced here.
After explaining and applying the norm of value clarity, its importance to
democratic governance in the United States will be defended. Finally, the
conditions which limit the capacity of the Court to fulfill the goal of value
clarity in constitutional decisionmaking will be explored.
I. CONTEMPORARY CONSTTUTIONAL THEORY
The central issue in normative constitutional scholarship remains what
Alexander Bickel referred to as "the countermajoritarian difficulty": 2 the power
of unelected, life-tenured Justices to "veto" the decisions of our elected
representatives, subject to reversal only through constitutional amendment,
possesses dubious legitimacy in a democracy.
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University Department of Political Science;
B.G.S., University of Kansas, 1979; M.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1981;
Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1990.
1 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 104
(1989).
2 ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
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Of course, most would agree that "the Constitution itself provides for
countermajoritarian trumps, called 'rights,' that the Court may play in
appropriate cases." 3 Although easing the tension between judicial review and
the principle of majority rule in a general way, the task remains of determining
precisely which rights do and do not count as legitimate trumps. Or, in Bickel's
words, it remains to be determined "which values, among adequately neutral
and general ones, qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or
whathaveyou to be vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by
legislative acts. And how is the Court to evolve and apply them?" 4
This question has produced a truly amazing array of responses. 5 For
example, interpretivists regard as exclusively legitimate only those values
expressly stated or clearly implied in the constitutional text.6 Noninterpretivists
would permit the Court to advance society's "fundamental values," variously
defined, even if not clearly expressed in the Constitution. 7 Process-based
theorists, such as John Hart Ely, respond that the Court should not choose and
impose values at all; instead, it may legitimately intervene only to correct
3 Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547,
580 (1981).
4 BICKEL, supra note 2, at 55.
5 For my own contribution, see TERRI PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL
COURT (forthcoming 1995).
6 See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACrIVIsM:
BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PREcARIOus SECuRITY? (1991); Richard A. Epstein,
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT.
REV. 159 (1973); Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a
Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975) (originating the interpretivist-
noninterpretivist distinction); J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial
Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1981).
7 While united in their willingness to allow the Court to go beyond the text,
noninterpretivists vary greatly with regard to which "fundamental values" the Court
should apply. However, equality and personal autonomy seem to be the most popular.
For a sampling of this approach, see generally RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1978); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONs OF AMERICAN
CoNsTrruTiONALISM (1989); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE
CONsTrruTiON (1986); ROGERS M. SMrrH, LIBERALiSM AND AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1985); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1988); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Michael J.
Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689
(1976). For a libertarian noninterpretivist approach, see STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW
RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
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malfunctions in the democratic process. 8
Yet another group of scholars is largely indifferent to the question of which
values the Court may legitimately assert in opposition to majority desires.
Proponents of "provisional review," such as Michael Perry and Paul Dimond,
argue that as long as the Court's judgments are provisional, subject as an
empirical matter to political response and revision, the conflict between judicial
review and democratic values is ameliorated. 9
Similarly, political scientists regard the countermajoritarian difficulty as
greatly exaggerated.10 Given that the United States' political system is rife with
obstacles to majority rule, it is nonsensical to demand of the Court some
exceptional justification for its similar deviance from the principle of majority
rule. Thus, the need for a theory by which constitutional values can be derived
in some objective, coherent manner in order to render the Court's
countermajoritarian character acceptable is nonexistent, resting on a
fundamental misunderstanding of how American politics actually operates.
For Critical Legal Studies scholars, the search for such a theory is in any
case doomed to failure, due to the inherently indeterminate nature of all forms
of interpretation and the contradictions of the liberal tenets upon which
constitutional theory rests.I 1 Accordingly, judicial power cannot be objectively
8 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). For other process-based
theories, see Louis LusKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Milner S. Ball, Judicial
Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059 (1974); Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3 (1970). Guido
Calabresi provides an approach which combines noninterpretivism and process-
oriented review. See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990 Term-Foreword:
Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate
Ignores), 105 H4Rv. L. REv. 80 (1991).
9 PAUL R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE (1989); MICHAEL
I. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RGHTs (1982); see also
JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984);
Calabresi, supra note 8; Daniel 0. Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and
the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 9 (1985); Terrance
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Harry H.
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J 221 (1973); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial
Review, 91 YALE L.. 486 (1982).
10 See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989);
PERETTI, supra note 5, at chs. 6-7; MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND JtniiaAL REviEw (1966); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at
74-83.
11 Given the lack of consensus among scholars in this field (to state it mildly), the
critics certainly have considerable "empirical" evidence on their side. For a sampling
of this extensive literature, see LIEF H. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL
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and coherently constrained and, thus, remains arbitrary and illegitimate.
The final approach, although admittedly overlapping many of the others, is
the legal process school. 12 Rather than emphasizing the "correctness" of any
particular value choice made by the Court, these theorists regard the process or
methodology of legal decisionmaking as centrally important in reducing the
tension between judicial power and democratic rule. Thus, judges should
carefully articulate the reasons supporting their decisions, speaking in terms of
general principles which are persuasively derived from text and precedent and
which transcend the immediate case. Focusing on process insures that the
development and application of constitutional doctrine will be principled rather
than ad hoc and arbitrary. The central notion which the legal process school
advances is that as long as judges obey the conditions attached to their privilege
as nonelective, life-tenured officials-to behave like judges and not like
legislators-the potential for abuse of power is vastly reduced. Adherence to
text and precedent and the requirement of principled, well-reasoned opinions
minimizes the opportunity for the arbitrary and illegitimate imposition of a
judge's personal values. 13
It is certainly difficult to argue with the legal process scholar's preference
for constitutional opinions which are clear, well-written, logical, coherent, and
persuasively placed in the context of precedent. However, the emphasis on
LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLrIcs (Richard A. Brody et al.
eds., 1985); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1988); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRrrIcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEME NT (1986); Paul
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Critical Legal
Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv. (1984); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1 (1985); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982).
12 See generally ARcHBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GovERNMENT (1976); John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional
Theoy and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different From Legislatures, 77
VA. L. REV. 833 (1991); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 739 (1982); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court
1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959). For an excellent application, see Michael I. Perry, Why the Supreme
Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v.
McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113 (1980).
13 1 argue that, in fact, the Justices' personal values are a legitimate and
democratically defensible source of constitutional decisionmaking. See PERETTI, supra
note 5.
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process too often results in a denial of or indifference to the need for the Court
inevitably to make choices between competing values. In other words, it may
produce a false sense of security, that being principled somehow gets the Court
out of the business of choosing the values about which to be principled.
Additionally, attention to traditional norms of judicial craft requires that
our evaluation focuses inward, to the internal logic and coherence of the
Court's opinions. While a matter of legitimate inquiry, we consequently
overlook the equally important issue of how the Court's opinions affect the
quality of the public debate which ensues.
To the degree that the Court is clear and certain in articulating the value
preferences underlying its decisions, it can contribute a focus and energy to that
debate. Thus, the aim of our concern with legal method should not be merely
the limiting of discretion per se as the key to easing the tension between
judicial power and democratic principles. Rather; that tension can be eased as
well by an equally strong concern with value clarity in opinion writing and its
consequences for the democratic resolution of the difficult issues facing the
nation.
IT. DEFNING AND APPLYING THE "VALUE CLARITY" NoRM
It may prove useful in explaining what value clarity is by first discussing
what it is not. Value clarity does not simply mean "truth in judging," which
some scholars and Justices advocate. 14 I am not imploring the Justices to be
more honest with regard to the "true" bases of their decisions-to state in a
simple and forthright manner that in their view a certain policy is beneficial to
society, rather than pretending their decision is dictated by text or precedent.
Nor am I asserting that it makes no difference which values the Court chooses
to advance or that we cannot distinguish between the relative persuasiveness or
authoritativeness of one choice compared to another. Rather, I am suggesting
that we separate the terribly difficult (and some would say unresolvable) issue
of which values the Court may legitimately impose, the dominant concern of
conventional constitutional theorists, from the important issue of how the Court
should go about articulating and defending its value choices.
The Court in its opinions should be clear with regard to the overriding
value it is choosing to advance and protect, whether economic liberty or
political equality or sexual autonomy. That is true irrespective of the identified
14 See Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1298
(1960); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949); Alpheus
T. Mason, Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions, 48 VA. L. REv. 1385
(1962); Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 661 (1960).
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source of that value. The Court should tell us precisely which value is being
advanced and why that value is so important.
The Court is also obligated to inform us which competing values are
consequently at risk and why they must lose out. Adopting Stephen Macedo's
formulation, the Court "must be prepared not merely to assert" its value
preference, it must also justify that preference "to dissenting citizens." 15 Thus,
the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick'6 was required to provide to Michael
Hardwick and others engaging in the prohibited act of sodomy, clear and
persuasive reasons why the right of the majority to condemn and punish
sodomy is more important than the right of the individual to make choices
regarding private, consensual sexual activity free from governmental intrusion.
Evaluating Supreme Court opinions according to their value clarity is
necessarily a subjective endeavor. 17 However, there is little doubt where we
must place Roe v. Wade.'8 It is an exceptionally strong candidate for the
"unclear" category. 19 As aptly stated by Mark Tushnet, Justice Blackmun's
"innovation" in Roe was "the totally unreasoned judicial opinion." 20
In his majority opinion, Blackmun reviewed (in painful detail) ancient
15 MACEDO, supra note 7, at 61.
16 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Court upheld, in a five to four vote, a
Georgia statute which criminalized sodomy and provided for up to twenty years
imprisonment.
17 Given the nature of our roles as constitutional law scholars and critics, there is
a tendency, if not an imperative, to find all opinions wanting in some regard or
another. Ely has argued that this tendency, the habit of "crying wolf," weakens our
capacity to recognize a truly terrible and dangerous decision, Roe v. Wade being the
prime example. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Woyf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.. 920 (1973).
18 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 The volume of scholarly criticism of Roe has been extraordinary. For a small
sampling, see Robert W. Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and
Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 978 (1981); Ely, supra
note 17; Epstein, supra note 6; Grano, supra note 6; Louis Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLuM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A
Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MoRAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45 (Jay L.
Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch
of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REv. 668 (1984); Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due
Process Revisited, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417 (1976).
20 TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 54. In fairness to Blackmun, we should
acknowledge that he did not have much with which to start. After all, Justice Douglas
based the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut on the existence of "penumbras,
formed by emanations" from the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965).
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attitudes toward abortion, the Hippocratic Oath forbidding abortion, and the
development of legal restrictions on abortion in common law and English and
American statutory law.21 He additionally described the views of the American
Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the
American Bar Association. 22 At last we get to Blackmun's constitutional
analysis, in which he briefly discusses the doctrinal mess known as "right of
privacy," 23 to which he blithely tacks on a woman's right to choose abortion.
Blackmun even provides us with a choice with regard to the textual source for
this right-either the Fourteenth Amendment's due process restrictions on
liberty, the majority's preference, or the Ninth Amendment, preferred by the
district court in Roe.24 Apparently, either will suffice. Blackmun then divides
the pregnancy into trimesters, based on medical developments concerning
maternal health and safety and fetal viability, varying the level of judicial
scrutiny accordingly. 25 The competing interest of the state in protecting
potential life is largely dismissed, due to the lack of consensus regarding when
life begins and whether the fetus is a person.26 We are then told at the
opinion's end that "the abortion decision... is inhqrently, and primarily, a
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician." 27
In sharp contrast to his muddled opinion in Roe is Blackmun's dissent in
the Bowers case.28 Here, his constitutional argument regarding the right of
21 Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-41.
22 Id. at 141-47.
23 Id. at 152-55.
24 Id. The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[the
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Court has
been quite reluctant to accept this broad invitation to elaborate other nonenumerated
rights.
25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
26 Id. at 157-59.
27 Id. at 166. For a critique of this emphasis on the physician's rather than
woman's choice, see Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in
Abortion and Sterilization, 6 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 51 (1983).
2 8 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). It is certainly easier to write a
clear and principled dissenting opinion than a clear and principled majority opinion,
given the need for compromise in order to obtain the support of additional Justices. If
the account of the writing of the Roe opinion in The Brethren is correct, the six
Justices joining Blackmun's majority opinion did in fact demand significant changes.
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 271-80 (Avon Books 1981)
(1979). Nonetheless, three Justices did endorse Blackmun's reasoning in Bowers by
joining his dissent (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens). Collegiality as a limitation on
achieving value clarity in opinion writing is discussed infra Part VI.A.
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privacy is developed more fully and coherently. For example, he organizes the
Court's previous right of privacy decisions into two "distinct, albeit
complementary" areas.29 First are those rulings which "recognized a privacy
interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for the individual
to make," 30 such as a woman's decision whether to abort and parental
decisions concerning childrearing and education. Second are those decisions
which have "recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain places
without regard for the particular activities in which the individuals who occupy
them are engaged." 31
The Georgia sodomy statute, argues Blackmun, "implicates both the
decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to privacy."32 Criminalizing
sodomy intrudes upon decisions regarding "sexual intimacy... a sensitive,
key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality," 33 and in which "the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form
and nature of these intensely personal bonds." 34 Additionally, the sexual act for
which Hardwick was arrested "occurred in his own home, a place to which the
Fourth Amendment attaches special significance," 35 and thus represents not
simply governmental invasion of a physical place, but "the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property." 36
Blackmun not only brings a clarity and much-needed coherence to the right
of privacy decisions, but he also more clearly and crisply states the competing
interests at stake, and directly addresses and rebuts the opposing views
expressed in the majority's opinion, again a significant departure from his Roe
opinion. Thus, Georgia asserts (and the Court majority accepts) its "right to
maintain a decent society," and to condemn sexual acts which "for hundreds of
years, if not thousands, have been uniformly condemned as immoral" and
which violate "traditional Judeo-Christian values." 37 However, Blackmun
argues that the majority's view of private morality cannot prevail simply
because of conformity to religious doctrine or because of the intensity with
which or the length of time such a view has been held. 38 In any case, whatever
29 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-04 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
30 Id. at 204.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
34 Id. at 205.
35 Id. at 206.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 210-11.
38 Id. at 211-12.
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harm is inflicted on those citizens due to their "knowledge that other
individuals do not adhere to one's value system," 39 (and Blackmun does not
regard such harm as "real" or substantial), it is surely insufficient, he argues,
to "justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to
live their lives differently." 40 Thus, Blackmun argues that the majority's right
to condemn and punish conduct it regards as immoral is far outweighed by the
fundamental right of individuals to make choices regarding sexual intimacy:
"[D]epriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct
their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply
rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever
do." 41 Although some may disagree with the weight Blackmun places on each
of the competing values, he has far more clearly and coherently elaborated and
justified the right of privacy and the inclusion of homosexual sodomy within
that general right.
More important than the clarity with which the Court expresses its value
judgments in individual opinions is the clarity of the general doctrines and
constitutional themes which the Court pursues, or what might be referred to as
"thematic clarity." Thus, we may criticize the Court during the Lochner era42
for the unpersuasive manner in which it interpreted the Due Process Clause as
a nearly absolute bar to state economic regulation. We may additionally have
grave doubts regarding the Court's legitimacy and competence to play such a
significant role in economic policymaking. We may further simply regard the
Court's decisions as unwise from a public policy standpoint. However, we
cannot fault the Lochner Court with regard to the clarity of purpose of its
constitutional pursuits: the vigorous protection of economic liberties from
governmental interference.
Similarly, the Warren Court was often criticized for its failure to adhere to
professional norms of legal reasoning and craftsmanship. 43 However, that
39 Id. at 213.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 214.
42 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner era refers to the
approximately 30-year period in which the Court employed a narrow interpretation of
the Commerce Clause and an expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause in order to place a roadblock in the way of efforts by both the
federal and state governments to regulate the economy. In Lochner, the Court struck
down a New York statute setting maximum work hours for bakers. The Court ruled
that the regulation unreasonably restricted the bakers' liberty of contract, the freedom
to contract with employers to work as many hours as they might wish. In the latter
years of this era of vigorous protection of economic rights and laissez faire, the Court
struck down numerous New Deal programs.
43 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT
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Court would receive high marks for the clarity and consistency of its
constitutional endeavor: to combat inequality, particularly with regard to race,
voting rights, and the criminal justice process.
To praise both the Lochner Court and the Warren Court is likely to strike
many readers as unusual, if not bizarre. However, that unconventional pairing
is sensible in light of the thematic clarity of each Court's constitutional
decisions and, accordingly, in light of the positive contribution each made to
the quality of the public debate which ensued. Before proceeding further in the
application and, thus, the clarification of this criterion, it will prove helpful to
explain more precisely the benefits of value clarity.
IV. THE VIRTUEs OF VALUE CLARrrY
The requirement that the Court's opinions be principled and firmly rooted
in text and precedent is intended, first, to minimize judicial discretion and the
arbitrary imposition of a Justice's personal views44 and, second, to promote
certainty and stability in the law. However, as Richard Saphire cogently
argues, the obsession with the processes and methodologies of interpretation
has led scholars to proceed too cautiously and to perceive the value of
interpretive theories in negative terms:
If the judicial process could not be purged completely of discretion... it could
not be justified. As thus conceived, the animating purpose of constitutional
theory has been to neutralize Constitutional doctrine of its moral content by
restraining the range of judicial choices that could be regarded as legitimate.
The success of its practitioners has been measured not so much by their ability
to delineate the range and depth of values properly invocable in Constitutional
argument, but by their ability to point to those that are not.45
Clarity in expressing the Court's value choices, on the other hand, is intended
to serve democratic ends in a positive way. Its aim is to invigorate and enrich
public debate, rather than merely to minimize the opportunity for judicial
intervention and prevent abuse of power. This function of focusing the nation's
attention on the constitutional dimensions of current political issues and
(1965); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968); PHILIP B. KURLAND, PoLrrIcs, THE CONsTrrTUTION,
AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); Hart, supra note 12.
44 As noted previously, I reject the conventional view that "value voting" by
Justices is arbitrary. I argue it is legitimate and democratic. See PERETTI, supra note
5.
45 Richard B. Saphire, The Search for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What
Price Purity?, 42 Omo ST. L. 335, 344 (1981).
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conflicts serves democratic ends generally and is directed more particularly to a
number of problems unique to American democracy.
In The Responsible Electorate, V. 0. Key argued that:
The voice of the people is but an echo chamber. The output of an echo
chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. As candidates
and parties clamor for attention and vie for popular support, the people's
verdict can be no more than a selective reflection from among the alternatives
and outlooks presented to them.46
As Key notes, there are inherent limitations on the ability of the people to
communicate a meaningful and coherent set of policy instructions to the
government. For example, in elections, the vocabulary of the people is largely
restricted to two words-"yes" and "no." They may vote for one candidate and
his or her set of policies or for another. A high premium is thus placed on the
quality of the choices given to voters. To the degree that the people are given a
clear, coherent, and meaningfid choice regarding competing policies, their
simple yes or no response has meaning. That choice is what permits them to
have a meaningful measure of control over government policy.
In short, the people are largely restricted to reacting, and must be given
something meaningful to which to react. This responsibility for putting before
the people meaningful policy initiatives is shared by many political leaders,
including Supreme Court Justices. It is in this way that value clarity in
Supreme Court opinions serves democratic ends.
However, in the United States there are additional and unusual obstacles to
the ability of government leaders to ascertain and then carry out the people's
desires, making the Court's contribution especially valuable. First, a clear and
certain consensus is far from realized privately, due to the size and diversity of
the population. Majority formation and expression are made more difficult by
the absence of policy-preference groupings which are coherent and relatively
enduring.
Of course, the inability of a consensus to emerge privately is precisely why
we create political institutions. However, the task for American political
institutions is a more daunting one than usual. Additionally, United States
political institutions are not well-designed or structured so as to ascertain and
respond to majority desires effectively. 47
Political parties in the United States, for example, have traditionally been
weak and highly decentralized organizations; additionally, they have grown
46 V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECrORATE 2 (1966).
47 Of course, this structure is often quite intentional. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison).
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weaker in the last few decades. 48 Consequently, parties have only a limited
capacity for organizing that morass of preferences into coherent and
comprehensive policy packages and for enforcing adherence to that platform by
all of the party's candidates. In other words, a clear consensus does not exist in
a natural state or as a result of a majority's identification with a political party.
In addition, voter attachment to one of the two major political parties has
weakened in the last thirty years. Fewer Americans identify themselves as
Democrats or Republicans, and more Americans regard the two parties in
negative terms or as irrelevant. 49 Especially important, split-ticket voting has
increased, resulting in more ambiguous and mixed messages being sent to
government leaders. Divided party control and interbranch stalemate are the
frequent and unsurprising result.50
Finally, our elections are not structured in such a way as to facilitate the
expression of majority preferences in a clear, specific, and comprehensive
manner. The President and the members of the House and Senate are elected
independently of each other, by different constituencies, and for different terms
of office. As a result, voters do not simultaneously elect a cohesive national
leadership and are hindered in transmitting an unequivocal policy message.
Given the size and diversity of the United States and the weaknesses in the
mobilizing and organizing capacities of its party and electoral mechanisms, the
task of building and sustaining a consensus for specific government policies
rests upon our governing institutions. 51 However, because of the diversity in
how those various institutions are composed and structured, each has its own,
often different, view regarding where that consensus lies.
Competition among those diverse institutions is expected to produce a
broader, more inclusive consensus. However, the road to that desired end is a
bumpy one. In the interim (which is to say, most of the time), there is great
noise and confusion over how a variety of issues are to be resolved.
One implication might be to require that the Court stay out of the
policymaking process as much as possible, thereby not adding to the noise.
4 8 See generally WILLIAM J. CROTTY, AMRIcAN PARTIES IN DECLINE (1984);
PARTY RENEWAL IN AMERICA (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1980); NELSON W. POLSBY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM (1983); FRANK J. SORAUF & PAUL A. BECK, PARTY
PoLrrIcS IN AMERICA (6th ed. 1988); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF
AMERICAN POLrrIcAL PARTmS, 1952-1988 (1990).
49 See WATTENBERG, supra note 48; Helmut Norpoth & Jerrold Rusk, Partisan
Dealignment in the American Electorate: Itemizing the Deductions Since 1964, 76 AM.
POL. Sca. REV. 522 (1982).
5 0 BEIAMN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFrER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: THE
DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF ELECrIONS IN AMERICA (1990).
51 Nelson W. Polsby, Legislatures, in HANDBOOK OF POLrrIcAL SCIENCE (Fred I.
Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).
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However, the Court has more to offer than simply "more of the same" policy
advice. Its unique status as a nonelective institution enables the Court to make a
similarly unique contribution to the consensus-building process. Although too
much is often made of it, the Court has greater political freedom to protect
values and groups given short shrift in other branches. The Rehnquist Court is
certainly proof that there is no guarantee that minority rights and freedoms will
be vigorously protected.5 2 Nonetheless, the Court remains an alternative
institutional site for reconsideration of government policy in light of
constitutionally guaranteed rights. As an example, although the Rehnquist
Court has usually been quite conservative, mostly in the form of deference to
the government (especially the executive branch), it has been quite reluctant to
allow governmental restrictions on free speech.5 3
The need for political leadership-providing the people something clear
and meaningful to which to react-is especially important in the United States.
Without leaders engaging us in a clear, value-focused debate, a political
consensus cannot emerge due to the great ambiguity and complexity of policy
preferences and the weaknesses of our party and electoral mechanisms in
mobilizing and organizing them.
By dealing with value conflicts in a clear and forthright manner, the Court
can add a focus and energy to public debate, thereby facilitating a dialogue on
and a political response to the issues of the day. For example, the conservative
Lochner era Court clearly and consistently ruled that economic liberty was a
constitutional trump of great importance and power. Furthermore, the
conservative Court majority in the 1930s invalidated a variety of New Deal
programs in a relatively short period of time. In doing so, it subjected the
emerging New Deal consensus to a clear and important constitutional critique,
permitting the people to re-evaluate and then overwhelmingly refute the old
consensus and definitively sanction a new one.54
Similarly, the Warren Court pursued the goal of economic and political
equality on a variety of fronts. In doing so, it put to a clear test the
commitment of the American people and their elected representatives to
5 2 For an excellent journalistic account, see DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT:
THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992). See also Chemerinsky,
supra note 1; Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking
Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REV. 43 (1990).
53 The best example of this reluctance is the Court's refusal to uphold flag
desecration statutes. U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989). Justices Scalia and Kennedy provided the key votes in transforming
the usual liberal trio of dissenters (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) into a majority.
54 Ackerman provides a similar account of the Court's positive contribution
during this time, in BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONs (1991).
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equality as an overriding value in public policy, thus leading to a more
definitive consensus on that issue.
In recent years, the increasingly conservative Rehnquist Court appeared to
be testing the people in a similar manner, but for a new and quite different
value--tradition or traditional morality. This value preference is clearly
foreshadowed in Bowers, the last case in which Chief Justice Burger wrote an
opinion. 55 In deciding whether to include homosexual sodomy among the
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court asked whether
such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."56 It
found such a claim "facetious" 57 because "[p]roscriptions against [homosexual
sodomy] have ancient roots." 58
Among the examples of the Rehnquist Court's invocation of tradition as an
important interpretive source, one case stands out-Michael H. v. Gerald D.59
In this 1989 case, five Justices rejected the claims of a natural father to
paternity and visitation rights over the daughter he conceived in an adulterous
affair. In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia addressed the question of how to
avoid the illegitimate imposition of the Justices' personal values in deciding
which Fourteenth Amendment liberties are so fundamental as to justify strict
judicial scrutiny. Scalia's answer was tradition: "Mhe interest denominated as
a 'liberty'" must "be an interest traditionally protected by our society"60 and
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as
fundamental." 61 In what became a much-discussed footnote, Scalia (joined only
by Rehnquist) further argued that the relevant tradition should be defined at the
most specific level of generality: because "general traditions provide such
imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the
society's views.... [1]f arbitrary decisionmaking is to be avoided, [we must]
adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference." 62 Thus, the
55 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
56 Id. at 194.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 192.
59 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
60 Id. at 122.
61 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
62 Id. at 127-28 n.6. For commentary regarding Scalia's opinion, see LAURENCE
H. TRIE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991); Bruce
Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 317
(Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); J.M. Balkin, Traition, Betrayal, and the
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 1613 (1990); Chemerinsky, supra
note 1, at 56, 94-95. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, in THE BILL
o0 RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992). Regarding the
"level of abstraction" problem more generally, see DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 134-
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question for Scalia became whether society has traditionally accorded special
respect and protection to a father whose child was "born into a woman's
existing marriage with another man." 63 The obvious answer was "no."
In his strongly-worded dissent, Justice Brennan attacked Scalia's
"interpretive method" as "misguided." 64 He argued that such an approach fails
to recognize that our society is a "facilitative, pluralistic one," 65 and that the
Constitution protects more liberties than those given "specific approval from
history." 66 For Brennari, the more appropriate question was "whether
parenthood is an interest that historically has received our attention and
protection." 67 The answer, like the answer to Scalia's question, was "too clear
for dispute." 68
Just as the old conservative Court of the early 1930s tested our
commitment to the New Deal, and the Warren Court tested our commitment to
the goal of equality, the Rehnquist Court appears to be testing our nation's
commitment to traditional morality, our tolerance for intolerance. To the
degree that it advances that value, clearly and singularly, in a variety of case
contexts, the Rehnquist Court qualifies as a "good" Court. It is the clarity and
consistency of its reverence for tradition which permits, indeed invites, a
political reaction. 69
The many scholars who decry the Rehnquist Court's frequent rejection of
constitutional claims in favor of deference to governmental authority are
unlikely to agree with this positive evaluation. However, I am not endorsing
the Rehnquist Court's substantive value choices; rather, I am endorsing, from
the standpoint of democratic values, its attempt to develop a clear constitutional
theme, to which the public and political leaders can react. Before constitutional
values and ideals can be deeply accepted, they must first be clearly stated.
Thus, value clarity helps to fulfill the proper commitment to the Constitution as
an ultimately democratic document.
36; Brest, supra note 11.
63 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125.
64 Id. at 140 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
6 5 Id. at 141.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
68 Id. This dispute regarding the appropriate level of generality was present as
well in Bowers. The Justices disagreed over whether the case involved a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the right of consenting adults to make intimate
choices regarding sexual activity, or more generally yet, the right to be left alone.
69 However, Chemerinsky argues that the Rehnquist Court, and Scalia in
particular, has been inconsistent in its adherence to tradition as an interpretive source.
Chemerinsky, supra note 1.
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V. A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ACKERMAN
Bruce Ackerman similarly believes that the Court, through the clarity and
force of its decisions, can strengthen the democratic process and enhance the
capacity of the people to address and resolve constitutional issues.70 For
example, he argues that the vigorous defense of economic liberties by the
conservative anti-New Deal Court
helped, not hurt, the democratic process through which the People gave new
marching orders to their government in the 1930's. By dramatizing the
fundamental constitutional principles raised by the New Deal, the Old Court
contributed to a more focused, and democratic, transformation of constitutional
identity than might otherwise have occurred. 71
Although he correctly regards this "focusing" role as beneficial to democratic
governance, Ackerman would permit the Court to exercise it, and the people to
benefit from it, only under highly unusual circumstances. The general role
which Ackerman assigns to the Court is "preservationist-the protection of
existing constitutional principles from change wrought by ordinary legislative
or executive action. 72 Through its resistance to statutory attempts to alter the
Constitution, the Court first signals to the people that constitutional change is
being contemplated and requires their attention. It then translates or re-casts
those statutory reform activities in constitutional terms; it forces the reformers
to shape and defend their goals in terms of a more clear and certain
constitutional debate. The Court, thus, helps to create a rare event: a
"constitutional moment," in which an unusually attentive, focused, and
mobilized citizenry is called upon to accept or reject a proposed constitutional
change. We the people are invited to endorse fundamental constitutional
change, either through a formal amendment or a series of significant electoral
victories, such as occurred in the New Deal era.73
The problem with Ackerman's view is that the Court's focusing and
energizing role is limited, reactive, and episodic. He gives to the Court the
single task of "preserving existing constitutional principles." Of course, this
70 ACKERMAN, supra note 54, at 104. Similarly, Goldstein argues that Supreme
Court Justices "have an obligation to maintain the Constitution, in opinions of the
Court and also in concurring and dissenting opinions, as something intelligible-
something that We the People of the United States can understand." JOSEPH
GOLDSTEiN, THE INTELLIGiBLE CONSTrruTioN 19 (1992).
71 ACKERMAN, supra note 54, at 104.
72 Id. at 10.
73 For example, Ackerman regards the Senate's rejection of the Bork nomination
as a "failed constitutional moment." Id. at 51.
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view erroneously assumes that such principles are knowable and widely
accepted. Ackerman additionally believes that the Court has played its signaling
and focusing role in a significant way only twice in America's history-in the
Civil War and New Deal eras. To view the history of constitutional change in
the United States as consisting almost entirely of "statutory valleys" and only a
few "constitutional peaks" cannot be taken seriously. It fails to recognize
constitutional change as an ongoing process. 74
Ackerman, thus, belittles the Court's role in the ongoing process of
constitutional change. The Court does not, and need not, merely protect a
previously-reached constitutional consensus from statutory alteration until that
rare moment when it is decisively rejected by the people. The Court
additionally can, does, and should play an active and critical leadership role in
the continual process of political and constitutional change.
The Warren Court, for example, certainly went beyond Ackerman's
assigned role of defending traditional, consensual constitutional principles. The
clarity and uniformity of purpose characterizing its egalitarian pursuits
represent precisely the type of political leadership which helps democracy to
work, especially in a large, heterogeneous, and structurally-fragmented system
like that in the United States. The Warren Court helped to provoke a heated
and focused public debate and thereby enhanced the ability of the people to
have a significant say over the critical political and constitutional issue of
equality. Certainly its egalitarian goals were not fully realized, most notably
with regard to public education, which is still marked by both racial
segregation and substantial inequality in funding. However, "success" is
defined here not in terms of having the Court's policy preferences ultimately
prevail, but in helping the people themselves to arrive at a consensus. This
definition explains how the Lochner Court can be praised as well. That Court
lost the battle, but "we the people" won the war. The Court's failures can,
thus, often be regarded as democratic successes.
VI. VALUE CLARITY AND JUDICIAL CAPACITY
The critical question which remains is whether value clarity in
constitutional decisionmaking is a reasonable goal and not merely a desirable
74 For several reviews of Ackerman's theory which provide similar criticisms, see
Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMM. 115
(1994); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's WE THE
PEOPLE, 9 CONST. COMM. 309 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About
Deliberation, 90 McH. L. REv. 1187 (1992); Christy Scott, Constitutional Moments
and Crockpot Revolutions, 25 CONN. L. REV. 967 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost
of Liberalism Past, 105 HARv. L. REv. 918 (1992).
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one. In fact, there are serious limitations on the capacity of the Court to attend,
strongly and consistently, to the norm of value clarity. What are these
limitations and how might they be overcome or at least ameliorated?
A. Collegiality
One significant limitation on the Court's ability to adhere consistently to
the norm of value clarity in opinion writing is the fact that constitutional
decisionmaking is collegial in nature. Attaining agreement among at least five
strong-willed individuals is no easy task. Negotiation and compromise
regarding specific doctrinal choices, characterizations of relevant precedents,
and the precise language to be employed often weaken the clarity and
coherence of the resulting opinion. The instruction to lower federal courts in
Brown v. Board of Education75 to proceed with "all deliberate speed" is a
perfect example. Thus, wise politics on the Court, as in other institutions, may
require fudging the value conflicts in the service of other goals, such as
consensus building within the Court. Nonetheless, when the Court pursues a
new policy course, it should not and cannot expect to build substantial and
long-term support for that policy by hiding behind unclear, unpersuasive, or
false grounds, as in Roe v. Wade.
B. Court Divisiveness
Adding to the difficulty of achieving agreement on a clearly and precisely
worded opinion is the not uncommon occurrence of strong ideological divisions
within the Court. Some degree of disagreement on the Court may be helpful in
terms of challenging the dominant constitutional philosophy and requiring the
majority to defend its views more fully and carefully. However, severe and,
parniculary, complex philosophical differences can make the goal of value
clarity virtually impossible.76 That is especially true when leadership on the
Court is weak or absent. The Burger Court is a perfect example. The
ideological divisions on that Court, the lack of leadership by Chief Justice
Burger, and the personal animosity toward him all contributed to the frequency
of plurality opinions and individual opinions.77 These factors may also explain
75 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
76 See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
QUESTIONS 155-68 (1992).
77 See, e.g., WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 28. The Furman v. Georgia
death penalty decision, consisting of nine separate opinions, is one of the better examples.
408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Burger Court's affirmative action decisions provide other
examples. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
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the Burger Court's propensity for balancing approaches over the Warren
Court's style of establishing general values and principles. 78 The consequence
of personal and political divisiveness on the Court, from the value clarity
perspective, is a reduced capacity to understand that Court, to "label" it and,
thus, to be capable of responding to its general constitutional course. As a
result, it is quite difficult for such a Court to build the necessary political
support for any new constitutional endeavor.
One possible implication is that a Court which is ideologically
homogeneous or "unbalanced" can be expected to do the best work, at least in
terms of being clear and consistent with regard to its constitutional policy
course. This conclusion runs directly contrary to Laurence Tribe's argument in
favor of ideological balance on the Court and his .corresponding advice to the
Senate to use its confirmation role to achieve that end.79
Yet another implication for judicial selection is the importance of
leadership within the Court, particularly by the Chief Justice. Political and
social leadership skills can be used to forge a majority consensus around a
general principle or policy goal and to overcome ideological and personal
differences, thereby serving the end of value clarity. What is critical is the
ability of at least a strong faction on the Court to organize around its preferred
value and to articulate it clearly and effectively. For example, that was the case
with the Court in the 1930s; despite its many five to four decisions, the value-
orientation of each faction was strongly and clearly expressed.
C. Value Clarity and Public Opinion
There is yet another significant limitation on the ability of the Court to
facilitate public debate through value clarity in opinion writing: the Court does
not control how its decisions are communicated, nor can it always count on the
public to be attentive to its rulings. Thus, value clarity may not have its desired
effect.
The Court's rulings reach the public indirectly, through other actors such
as the media, other political leaders, and the legal profession. It is, thus,
dependent on the ability and desire of others to communicate its decisions
clearly and effectively.
The problem with the media begins with the fact that coverage of the Court
U.S. 265 (1978).
7 8 Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger, in THE NEW
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (Anthony King ed., 2d ed. 1990).
7 9 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 106-24 (1985).
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is neither in-depth nor continuous.80 Additionally, stories tend to focus on the
sensational. Finally, the training and expertise of journalists covering the Court
have only recently improved. 81 Thus, the Court can speak in the clearest of
terms regarding the values it is advancing, but it comes to nothing if that
decision or line of cases fails to attract the attention of the media or is poorly
covered.
The Court is also dependent on lower court judges, elected officials, and
legal professionals to interpret and communicate its decisions. They will do so
in accordance with their own interests, thereby independently shaping the
ensuing debate as well.
There are several strategies available to the Court for overcoming these
obstacles. Members might, for example, "go public." They can give speeches
or interviews and address the public directly, particularly for those policies
about which they care deeply. For example, Chief Justice Earl Warren took
great care in writing the Brown opinion to insure that it could be printed in full
in the nation's newspapers and would thus be directly accessible to the public
(or at least the "attentive" public);82 it was a short opinion which was written
in simpler, less legalistic language than is typical. At least until recently, the
Justices were quite typically former politicians and, therefore, possessed the
political acumen and skills necessary to anticipate the likely reaction of, and
shape their opinions in light of, the external political environment. 83
A more radical approach to enhancing the effectiveness of the Court in
reaching and persuading the public would be to employ the modem tools
commonly used by others: a press office and a staff of media consultants. The
thought of a media consultant, accustomed to devising a 30-second hit jpiece
along the lines of former President Bush's Willie Horton ads, aiding the Court
in its efforts no doubt seems bizarre and horrifying to most. Yet, the Court
80 See generally DAVID L. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEws MEDIA
(1968); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 111-16, 229-34 (1991); Ethan
Katsh, The Supreme Court Beat: How Television Covers the U.S. Supreme Court, 67
JUDICATURE 6 (1983); Chester A. Newland, Press Coverage of the United States
Supreme Court, 17 W. POL. Q. 15 (1964); David Shaw, Media Coverage of the
Courts: Improving but Still Not Adequate, 65 JUDICATURE 18 (1981); Elliot E.
Slotnick, Television News and the Supreme Court: A Case Study, 77 JUDICATURE 21
(1993).
81 ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at 112.
82 Warren described this strategy in his memoirs, excerpts of which are reprinted
in JOEL B. GROSSMAN & RIcHARD S. WELLS, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw AND JuDIciAL
POLICYMAKING 448-52 (2d ed. 1980).
83 My current project involves documenting and evaluating the dramatic shift in
the career backgrounds of Supreme Court Justices. The dominant recruitment pool
used to be prominent politicians; it is now the federal judiciary.
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most certainly would understand that its decisions would -require different
"handling" than is typically the case. This suggestion is not entirely frivolous;
more attention and care on the part of the Court in presenting itself and its
decisions might result in greater public awareness and understanding.
Strengthening the Court's capacity to control the manner in which its
decisions are communicated to the public could also be directed to the final
limitation on the ability of value clarity to have its desired effect: the general
inattentiveness of the public. Public opinion research consistently reveals that
the public's knowledge about the Court and its decisions is quite limited.84 (Of
course, that lack of knowledge holds true for other government institutions as
we. 85) In most surveys, "only about 40 percent of the American public, at
best, follows Supreme Court actions, as measured by survey respondents
having either read or heard something about the Court."8 6 In a 1989
Washington Post poll, nine percent of the public could name the Chief Justice,
while twenty-five percent could name Judge Wapner of television's "People's
Court" fame.87 And in surveys taken in 1975 and 1982, approximately sixty
percent of Americans did not know, even generally, what the Court had ruled
in Roe v. Wade.88 Finally, "in a 1990 survey, '[1]ess than one-fourth of the
respondents knew how many justices there are, and nearly two-thirds of them
could not name a single member of the Court.'" 89
84 MARSHALL, supra note 10, at 142-45; David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman,
Support for the Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 405
(1983); Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMENiCAN COURTS:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Caldeira, Courts]; Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword:
Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1209
(1986) [hereinafter Caldeira, Neither]; Gregory Casey, Popular Perceptions of
Supreme Court Rulings, 4 AM. POL. Q. 3 (1976); William J. Daniels, The Supreme
Court and Its Publics, 37 ALB. L. REv. 632 (1973); Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Public
Views the Supreme Court, in LAW, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 194 (Herbert
Jacob ed., 1976); John H. Kessel, Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court, 10
MIDWEST J. POL. SC. 167 (1966); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public
Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some
Prequisitesfor Court Legitimation of Regime Change, 2 L. & Soc'Y Rv. 357 (1968).
85 For example, typically only 35-40% of Americans can correctly name their
congressional representative. Richard Morin, The Ignorant 80s, WASH. POST, Dec.
24, 1989, at C5 (quoting from The University of Chicago General Social Survey,
1987).
86 ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at 126.
87 Morin, supra note 85, at CS.
88 ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at 236.
8 9 STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
357 (4th ed. 1993) (quoting Marcia Coyle, How Americans View High Court, NAT'L
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Additionally, Thomas Marshall's study found little evidence to support the
notion that the Court's decisions affect public opinion. He compared the
eighteen Court decisions from 1935 to 1986 in which there was pre- and post-
decision poll data. The Court's impact on public opinion was typically small
and the "direction" of impact varied. The public shifted in favor of the Court's
position in only six of the eighteen instances, away from the Court's position in
nine instances and, in three instances, there was no shift at all.90 Marshall
concluded that "Supreme Court decisions seldom greatly influence American
public opinion either over the short term or the long term." 91
Does such evidence sound the death knell for the argument advanced here,
that value clarity in opinion writing enhances public debate and serves
democratic ends? For several reasons, I think not. For example,
methodological difficulties abound in this area, making clear and certain
conclusions regarding the relationship between the Court and public opinion
quite difficult.92 Additionally, some studies have provided contrary evidence
regarding both limited public awareness of the Court's decisions and a limited
Court capacity to affect public opinion. For example, Liane Kosaki's 1989
survey of St. Louis residents did not produce the expected uniformly low rates
of public awareness of Supreme Court decisions. Although only 22.1 percent
of the respondents were aware of the Court's "dial-a-porn" decision 93 and 31.5
percent regarding its decision on the death penalty for minors,94 71.7 percent
were aware of Court action with regard to flag-burning, 95 and 83.5 percent
were aware of recent Court activity regarding abortion rights. 96 These findings
suggest that "the public is neither universally ignorant nor universally informed
about Court decisions." 97
In a similar vein, some studies have suggested that the Court can in fact
affect public opinion. For example, Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey found that
federal courts often significantly affected public opinion, though negatively.
Their rulings on affirmative action and school desegregation, for example, did
L.. 1 (Feb. 26, 1990)).
90 MARSHALL, supra note 10, at 145-47.
91 Id. at 155; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 80; Larry R. Baas & Dan Thomas,
The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation, 12 AM. POL. Q. 335 (1984).
92 See Caldeira, Courts, supra note 84.
93 Sable Communications, Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
9 4 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
95 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
9 6 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
97 Liane C. Kosaki, Public Awareness of Supreme Court Decisions 11 (Aug. 29-
Sept. 1, 1991) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
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produce a reaction: increased public opposition. 98 In contrast, Thomas
Marshall found that judicial activism and liberal outcomes resulted in greater
public support for the Court's position.99 Caldeira's study of changing public
opposition to President Roosevelt's 1937 Court-packing plan revealed that two
"Court actions"-its decision to uphold the Wagner Act'00 and the resignation
of a powerful New Deal opponent, Justice Van Devanter-succeeded in
decreasing support for FDR's plan by almost ten percent. 10'
A study by Franklin and Kosaki regarding the impact of Roe v. Wade on
public attitudes toward abortion suggests that the Court may influence public
opinion, but in unexpected and unintended ways.' 2 Roe did increase public
support for abortion involving "hard" reasons, for example, in the case of fetal
defect or when the health of the mother is endangered. However, with regard
to public support for discretionary abortions (i.e., for "soft" reasons such as
being unmarried, poor, or not wanting more children), Roe had the effect of
polarizing public opinion: increasing the opposition of pro-life advocates and
the support of pro-choice advocates, with overall approval changing not at
all. 10 3 Wlezien and Goggin found that despite the lack of change in overall
approval, there was growing public support in the 1980s for "current abortion
policy." They attributed this trend to media reports that Supreme Court
decisions (and Supreme Court nominations) would lead to greater restrictions
on abortion access.104 A study conducted by Mondak found some evidence of
the Court's "persuasive force," but only under certain conditions, for example,
when the issue lacked personal relevance or when the Court's credibility was
substantially greater than other attributed sources (such as high school
principals or city police). 105 Finally, Professor Canon's examination of the
effectiveness of the Court's "cheerleading" with regard to desegregation and
abortion led him to conclude that "the Court can place a politico-moral issue on
the national front burner," but has only a "limited ability to guide [it]... to
98 Benjamin I. Page et al., What Moves Public Opinion?, 81 AM. POL. SC. REV.
23(1987).
99 MARSHALL, supra note 10; Thomas R. Marshall, The Supreme Court as an
Opinion Leader, 15 AM. POL. Q. 147 (1987).100 NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
10 1 Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's
Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1139, 1149 (1987).
102 Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S.
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 751 (1989).
103 Id. at 759.
104 Christopher B. Wlezien & Malcolm L. Goggin, The Courts, Interest Groups,
and Public Opinion About Abortion, 15 POL. BEHAv. 381 (1983).
105 leffery J. Mondak, Perceived Legitimacy of Supreme Court Decisions: Three
Functions of Source Credibility, 22 POL. BEHAv. 363 (1990).
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consensus or resolution." 1°6 Of course, this conclusion is quite consistent with
the stated goal of the value clarity norm-provoking but not dictating a
democratic resolution to a significant public issue.
Certainly, the weight of the evidence is that the public is uninformed and
unattentive with regard to Supreme Court decisions. However, the evidence is
more mixed, and less methodologically sound, with regard to the impact of
Supreme Court decisions on public opinion.
D. Value Clarity and Judicial Capaciy: A Reassessment
A variety of conditions pose a threat to the ability of the Court both to
issue consistently "value clear" opinions and to affect public debate in a
significant and positive manner. These conditions include the collegial nature of
decisionmaling and opinion writing, the possibility of both weak leadership of
and complex ideological divisions within the Court, the limited control over
how its decisions are communicated, and the limited public awareness and
receptivity to the Court's decisions generally and its opinions more particularly.
However, it should first be noted that such limitations are not discussed in
constitutional law scholarship, nor viewed as critical to reconciling judicial
review with democratic values. This Article has argued that this lack of
attention is an unfortunate oversight. Additionally, such limitations are not
insurmountable. Efforts can and should be made to strengthen leadership on the
Court, to improve the clear communication of the Court's decisions, and to
engage the public more effectively on existing or emerging political issues,
particularly their constitutional dimensions.
In any case, these limitations do not constitute adequate reasons for the
Court not to make the attempt to be clear with regard to the discretionary value
choices it is making. For example, despite low levels of public attentiveness
generally, research shows that when the Court engages the public, evaluations
of the Court's decisions which ensue are based on political agreement or
disagreement, rather than reverence for the Court as has often been
suggested. 10 7 These democratic conditions are precisely what should exist for
the Court to initiate, and not to foreclose, public debate. The key for the Court,
as it is for other political leaders, is breaking through to the public
106 Bradley C. Canon, The Supreme Court as a Cheerleader in Politico-Moral
Disputes, 54 J. PoL. 637, 650, 652 (1992).
107 Caldeira, Neither, supra note 84; Casey, supra note 84; Kenneth M. Dolbeare
& Phillip E. Hammond, The Political Party Basis of Attitudes Toward the Supreme
Court, 37 PuB. OPINION Q. 16 (1968); Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, The Supreme
Court, Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. Q. 85
(1980); Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 84.
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consciousness, which is in turn well-served by value clarity.
Value clarity in the Court's opinions is, thus, a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the democratic resolution of political conflict which we desire.
Other conditions-the faithful communication of the Court's message and the
public's willingness to listen to and to care about the message-must be
fulfilled as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
Value clarity in constitutional decisionmaking is an important but
overlooked norm for Justices to strive to satisfy and for scholars to employ in
their evaluations. In contrast to the legal process approach, the goal of our
concern with judicial process and method should not be the negative goal of
minimizing judicial discretion. Rather, it should be the positive goal of
facilitating a dialogue, promoting a more focused public debate and, thus,
bringing the nation closer to a democratic resolution of the important issues of
the day. Value clarity can therefore ease the tension between judicial review
and democratic principles.
This function of placing before the people clear and meaningful value
choices is important in any democracy. However, it is especially important in a
country as large and diverse as the United States, with weak political parties
and with a government in which power is diffused and fragmented.
Value clarity is certainly not the only criterion by which we can judge the
Court. It is nonetheless more consistent with democratic values than other
standards typically advanced, such as correspondence with the Framer's
intent108 or the notion, advanced by Judge J. Skelly Wright, that "the ultimate
test of a judge's work is goodness." 109 The ultimate test of the Court's work, it
has been argued here, is public acceptance, a significant degree of
understanding of and support for those constitutional values which the Court
has "run through the process" and, thus, to which the people have consented.
That democratic end is served by value clarity.
108 BORK, supra note 6.
109 J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1971).
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